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1.0 Executive Summary 
 
Redistricting needs objectivity. 
 
Fair and free elections are a cornerstone of American government. But which votes matter?  
Who is allowed on the ballot? By drawing the lines that determine where citizens vote, 
redistricting has a huge impact on these basic questions. To maintain the credibility of 
democracy, voting lines and stump speeches must not be allowed to become only a shiny 
veneer, hiding the fact that the real decisions have already taken place in redistricting. 
 
Redistricting in the United States does not have an honorable history. In 1812, Massachusetts 
Governor Elbridge Gerry was accused of politicking a district so absurd that the result 
resembled a salamander; the term “gerrymander” was coined as a result.1 After the Civil War, 
Democrats in the South used redistricting to disenfranchise black voters, a large part of the 
motivation for the 1965 Voting Rights Act.2 Redistricting is especially difficult in Texas 
because of its vast, growing and diverse population. In 2003, as Texas Republicans forced a 
partisan redistricting plan through the state legislature, fifty-eight Democratic House 
members fled the state to prevent a quorum, stalling the legislative process for weeks.3  
Because of this troubled history, there has been a national push for more neutral, objective 
principles in the redistricting process.       
 
This report builds on the redistricting reforms and best practices that have been developing 
across the United States for decades, integrating tested concepts to develop four neutral, 
objective criteria for a fair redistricting process: 
 
 Representational Fairness - Are demographic & party groups given a fair allotment? 
 Communities of Interest – Do citizens vote with their natural neighbors? 
 Compactness – Do districts look fair? 
 Legality – Does the redistricting plan fulfill all legal requirements? 
 
We then apply these principles to the practical challenge of redrawing Texas Congressional 
districts, producing a redistricting that substantially improves on existing maps.  A 
discussion of the benefits, drawbacks and technical limitations of our analysis concludes the 
work, together with suggestions for further improvement.  
 
By moving toward fair principles, lawmakers can create a sustainable process that soothes 
the wounds inflicted by old political battles. Redistricting needs a change. The elephants and 
donkeys have fought for long enough. It is time for objectivity. 
                                                     
1
 Martis, Kenneth C. The Original Gerrymander. Political Geography 27 (2008) 833-839. November 5, 2008. 
2
 Toobin, Jeffrey. The Great Election Grab: When Does Gerrymandering Become a Threat to Democracy? The   
New Yorker. December 8, 2003. http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/12/08/031208fa_fact?  
3
 NY Times, Democrats Hide To Halt Action On Texas Redistricting, May 13, 2003. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/13/us/democrats-hide-to-halt-action-on-texas-redistricting.html  
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2.0 The Texas Redistricting Process 
 
Americans have often assumed the redistricting process—both in Texas and throughout the 
United States— to be apolitical in nature and have trusted their state representatives make 
every effort to draw fair and representative districts. Ironically, the redistricting process is 
often one of the most political processes performed by state lawmakers.  Legislators and 
their staffs devote considerable time and effort to ensure that their interests are well-
represented.  Usually performed decennially by state legislative committees or 
“independent” redistricting commissions, the process itself is fundamentally based on 
distributing limited resources with clear winners and losers. Furthermore, the implications 
can be long-lasting and can directly affect which party maintains control in the future.   
2.1 Legal Requirements 
Several bodies of legal dicta rule the creation of new district maps in Texas. The 
interpretation of the various statutes and judicial decisions can swiftly become intricate and 
complicated. A complete explanation is not possible here, but a summary of salient 
principles is. In essence, the guiding concept behind federal redistricting law can be roughly 
summarized as “one person, one vote.”  
2.1.1 Equal Population 
Intuitively, the simplest legal requirement is equal population. The Constitution states that 
representatives “shall be apportioned… according to their respective numbers.” In practice, 
attaining equal populations is challenging, and the population equality standards are much 
higher for Congressional districts than for state offices.  
 
Federal courts have largely construed 
provisions of Article I and the 14th 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
to specifically require that 
Congressional districts contain 
precisely equal populations. However, 
this principle is not uniformly 
understood or enforced. In Karcher v. 
Daggett, the Supreme Court rejected a 
plan that had an overall deviation 
range of less than 1%.4 Since that time, 
states have been required to map 
Congressional districts that are as 
“equal as practical,” with even minor 
deviations requiring specific, 
compelling justification. Today only 10 
                                                     
4
 Karcher v. Daggett, 1983. 462 U.S. 725 
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states have any variation exceeding 0.00%, with the largest deviation being Idaho at 0.60%.   
 
In practice, this means that Congressional districts which vary by even the amount of a few 
census blocks must be justified with a specific explanation, or risk rejection in court.5 
 
State legislative districts have been allowed, in general, to contain total variations of up to 
10%. However, several recent redistricting challenges to maps containing variations less than 
10% have been sustained, because the variations, though small, have been shown to be 
discriminatory. In the end, districts need to be very close to equal in population, but exact 
equality is not expressly required.  
2.1.2 Minority Voting Rights 
Federal and state courts have consistently held that “a plan may not intentionally dilute the 
voting strength of members of a racial or ethnic minority group” and “a plan that contains 
districts drawn primarily on the basis of race or ethnicity requires a compelling 
justification.”6  
Several districts in the current map will be recognized as protected districts, because they 
represent either a majority minority or a minority opportunity districts. These districts are 
legally bound to remain substantially the same, to preserve minority voting power. Both the 
“packing” of minority voters into a single district and the “cracking” of minority regions into 
smaller pieces of white districts are not permissible. Furthermore, “members of a racial or 
language minority group…may challenge a redistricting plan that limits or diminishes their 
opportunity to participate in the electoral process and to elect representatives of their 
choice.”7 
2.1.3 Alternative Scenarios 
In Texas, if the legislature does not pass a legal redistricting plan for the state House or 
Senate, the responsibility shifts to the Legislative Redistricting Board (LRB). The LRB is 
composed of the lieutenant governor, speaker of the house, attorney general, comptroller, 
and land commissioner. If an acceptable US House map is not drawn, either the governor 
can call a special legislative session specifically to deal with redistricting, or the courts will 
take up the issue.  
Texas is one of sixteen states that have special requirements under Section 5 of the Voting 
Rights act to gain preclearance from the US Department of Justice or the District Court of 
the District of Columbia.8 Even after the preclearance requirement is met, citizens and 
organizations still have the right to allege in court that some aspect of the redistricting map 
                                                     
5
 Texas Legislative Council. State and Federal Law Governing Redistricting in Texas, Chapter 2. 
http://www.tlc.state.tx.us/pubspol/redlaw01/redlaw01.pdf.  
6
 Texas Legislative Council. State and Federal Law Governing Redistricting in Texas, Chapter 1. 
http://www.tlc.state.tx.us/pubspol/redlaw01/redlaw01.pdf 
7
 Texas Legislative Council. State and Federal Law Governing Redistricting in Texas, Chapter 1. 
http://www.tlc.state.tx.us/pubspol/redlaw01/redlaw01.pdf.  
8
 Redistricting Information. US Department of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/redistricting.php  
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Figure 2.1 Texas Ten Year Population Change by County 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2010) 
is unconstitutional or illegal in some way. If a legal challenge is sustained, the court 
reviewing the case may require the state to correct the violation, or may assume the 
authority to redraw the boundaries itself. In such cases, courts have traditionally respected 
the will of the legislature as expressed in the challenged map, as much as possible. 
2.2 Demographic Changes and Implications 
During the past ten years, significant changes have fundamentally altered the character and 
demographic make-up of Texas.  Rich natural resources and a business-friendly 
environment have attracted both U.S. natives and foreign-born citizens to the Lone Star 
State.  Ultimately, demographic changes (due mostly to a growing Hispanic population) 
present significant challenges to state lawmakers and legislative staff who are responsible for 
ensuring that all Texans are sufficiently represented fairly within state government. 9 
Texas has seen population 
growth that has far outpaced 
nationwide growth. 
According to the U.S. Census, 
Texas’ population was 
estimated at 24.7 million, 
representing an 18% increase 
from 2000-2009.  This is 
almost twice the national 
population growth rate of 9%. 
From 2000 to 2009, Fort 
Worth grew by 39%, Austin 
grew by 20%, San Antonio 
grew by 16.0%, and Dallas 
grew by 1%. Texas’ population 
is also younger, with 28% 
younger than 18, compared to 
the nationwide average of 
24%.10  
 
 
 
                                                     
9
 Texas A&M University Real Estate Center, Monthly Review of the Texas Economy, 
http://recenter.tamu.edu/econ/  
10
 U.S. Census Bureau, International Database, http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/informationGateway.php   
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Figure 2.2 Texas Ten Year Population Percent Change by 
Ethnicity (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010) 
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Figure 2.3 Texas’ Hispanic population is expected to 
surpass Anglo population by 2014 (U.S. Census Bureau and 
Texas State Data Center, 2011) 
Educational attainment in Texas is 
lower than the rest of the U.S.  
Seventy-five percent of high school 
graduates in Texas have a college 
degree, compared to 80% 
nationwide.  Furthermore, 23% of 
Texans obtained a bachelor’s 
degree, which is slightly lower than 
24% experienced nationwide.  
Furthermore, if the income 
differential between Anglos and 
non-Anglos persists, a larger share 
of Texans could be drawn into 
poverty in the future. According to 
the Texas State Data Center, the 
share of households with annual 
incomes of $25,000 or less will 
increase from 31% in 2000 to 38% 
by 2040. Moreover, the percentage 
of families with earnings exceeding 
$100,000 will fall from 12% percent 
to 9%. The net impact could be a 
decline in real income, reduced tax 
revenue per household and 
increased burden on the state 
government to pay for welfare 
services in Texas. As the state is 
likely to depend progressively 
more on non-Anglo Texans for 
future tax revenues, it is 
important to lessen the existing 
wage gap and education 
differential between ethnic 
groups.11 
As a result of these shifting state 
demographics, more demands will 
be placed on housing, health care 
and social services. According to the 
Texas State Demographer’s Office, 
Hispanics will make up a majority of 
                                                     
11
Texas State Data Center, http://txsdc.utsa.edu/ 
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Apr. 7, 2011, the Texas Tribune held a seminar in which 
both State Rep. Burt Solomons and Sen. Ken Seliger 
discussed their thoughts on redistricting. Both Committee 
chairmen believed in “bringing in as many members as 
possible into the process” as the best strategy in the coming 
months for Redistricting. 
the state population by 2020.12 This significant increase has far-reaching implications for 
education, housing and the labor force. As a result, one key issue facing Texas will be how to 
incorporate these new ethnic groups into the legislative process as the population continues 
to grow. As lawmakers begin to draw up future district boundaries, effort should be made to 
ensure that these ethnic groups receive adequate representation. 
2.3 Redistricting in 2011: The 82nd Legislature 
Political leaders in the past 
frequently shied away from 
directly answering questions 
regarding the decision process 
used in drawing district 
boundaries. In an interesting 
departure from years past, 
Republican leaders from both 
the Texas House and Senate 
voiced their preferences in a 
redistricting seminar organized 
by the Texas Tribune in April 
2011.  Senate Select Redistricting 
Committee Chair Kel Seliger (R-
Amarillo) stated that he “does 
not intend” to incorporate any 
“objective criteria” proposed by 
some public policy advocacy 
groups when drawing new 
Congressional districts.   
House Redistricting Committee 
Chair Burt Solomons (R-
Carrollton) indicated that he 
“plans to work with leading 
members of the House” to draw 
as fair districts as possible.  He 
also suggested that he would try 
to “bring in as many members 
into the process as possible to 
ensure that all implications are 
considered.”   
Furthermore, many state lawmakers have also indicated that future districts will likely be 
drawn to favor Republicans. Both redistricting chairs indicated that four new Congressional 
                                                     
12
 Texas State Data Center, Texas Population Estimates Program, 2009. 
http://txsdc.utsa.edu/tpepp/txpopest.php 
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districts that Texas gained as a result of the population shift will likely be drawn to ensure 3 
Republicans and 1 Democrat win in 2012.  While both redistricting leaders indicated that 
districts will not be drawn to ensure a Republican “sweep” of all new Congressional seats, a 
2-2 Democratic/ Republican split map is not likely.  
Finally, both chairs predicted major district changes in West Texas, particularly due to 
depopulation.  Both Rep. Solomons and Sen. Seliger suggest that members “need to plan for 
the worst, but hope for the best.” Seliger said he will “look at the numbers,” and attempt to 
save as many Republican seats as possible. Both leaders suggest that districts will probably 
be drawn to include West Texas with urban centers east of interstate 35.13 For the remainder 
of the 82nd Legislative Session, both redistricting leaders intend on encouraging Republican 
members from both chambers to offer input and guidance in the process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
13
 Texas Tribune Seminar, Between the Lines: A Conversation about Redistricting, featuring Rep. Burt Solomons 
and Sen. Kel Seliger.  Apr. 7, 2011 at the Austin Club, 110 E. Ninth Street, Austin, TX   
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29 
States 
 
21 
States 
 
Legislative-Drawn Independent Commission Used
Figure 3.1 While a majority of states utilize a 
legislative-drawn redistricting process, there is not 
a major preference for one process over the other. 
3.0 Redistricting in Other States 
 
Under the U.S. Constitution, states are 
given the power to draw legislative 
boundaries.  Further, federal court rulings 
have required districts that must be roughly 
equal in size, in accordance with the “one 
person, one vote” principle. However, in 
recent decades the partisan nature of the 
redistricting process has come under public 
attack.  There have even been bipartisan 
calls for change.  New York Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg released a report concluding 
that “shifting redistricting responsibility to 
a nonpartisan or independent entity and 
moving to “top two” election structure leads 
to more competition in general elections.”14 
In sum, 29 states conduct a legislative-
drawn redistricting process, while 21 states 
incorporate some form of an 
“independent” commission in their 
redistricting process.15  
3.1 States with a Legislatively Drawn Redistricting Process 
Following the 2000 U.S. Census, there are 29 states that utilize several alternatives for 
partisan legislative redistricting. With partisan plans, actors could be thought of as having 
two major goals:  to re-elect a majority of their party’s incumbents and to pick up seats from 
the minority party.  It can pack voters from the minority party into overwhelmingly safe 
districts for that party, thus wasting their votes.  The majority party may also dilute the 
minority party’s strength by spreading the latter’s supporters among several districts, 
resulting in splintered support.  Bipartisan plans can be the consequence of divided 
government, which gives each party at least one veto in the process.16  Bipartisan plans, 
however, often require greater consensus to enact than with partisan plans because both 
parties need to be satisfied.  However, because all legislators can be assumed to have the 
same personal goal of re-election, a plan that protects incumbents may be agreed upon 
easily by both sides. In both partisan and bipartisan redistricting processes, individual actors 
                                                     
14
 The Journal News, Dec. 13, 2010. Bloomberg Pushes Party-Free Redistricting. 
http://polhudson.lohudblogs.com/2010/12/13/bloomberg-pushes-party-free-redistricting/  
15
 Redistricting Online, Redistricting Process Online, http://www.redistrictingonline.org 
16
 Basinger, Scott J., and Michael J. Ensley. 2003. “Endogeneity Problems in Congressional Elections Research: 
District Competitiveness, Candidate Quality, and Campaign Spending.” Presented at the Annual Meeting 
of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA.  
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are primarily concerned with maintaining the status quo; therefore we expect little or no 
change in the competitiveness of seats drawn by legislatures.17 
In Indiana, the General Assembly has the authority of drawing legislative and Congressional 
boundaries. If the General Assembly fails to enact a redistricting plan, a redistricting 
commission is formed.  This five person commission consists of the House Speaker, Senate 
President, Committee Chairpersons of redistricting committees in both houses, and 
additional appointee of the Governor.  The Governor has the power to veto any redistricting 
plan for any reason.18   
In Georgia, the redistricting process in the State House falls to the Legislative and 
Congressional Reapportionment Committee and in the Senate to the Reapportionment and 
Redistricting Committee.19  Virginia’s General Assembly introduces the redistricting plan as 
a bill. The Elections Committee then revises the introduced plan and submits the final plan 
to the Governor. The Governor has the authority to veto any redistricting plan.20 
3.2 States with a Commission or Court Redistricting Process 
Several states have redistricting commissions or 
courts that propose or approve final redistricting 
plans. Generally, redistricting commissions and 
courts are not subject to the same electoral and 
institutional constraints in the redistricting 
process as state legislators. However, in most 
cases, they do have a responsibility to be fair and 
impartial.   
In some cases, commissioners are not elected 
officials; in some states they are not even 
allowed to hold elected office for a number of 
years after the redistricting cycle. In other states, 
commissions are made up of state legislators and 
gubernatorial representatives or appointees. 
Twenty-one states have a redistricting commission that draws up the redistricting plan, 
advises the legislature on drawing up the plan or acts as a backup if the legislature fails to 
draw up the plan for legislative districts.  In Alaska, the Governor appoints two members to 
the commission, the Senate President appoints one, the Speaker of the House appoints one, 
and the Supreme Court appoints one. No member of the commission may be a public 
employee.   
                                                     
17
 Mayhew, David W. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
18
 Hayden, Maureen, “Indiana House Walkout May put Legislative Redistricting in Peril,” Indiana Economic 
Digest, Mar. 9, 2011. http://www.indianaeconomicdigest.net/main.asp?   
19
 Georgia State Assembly, Senate Reapportionment & Redistricting, accessed March 29, 2011. 
http://www1.legis.ga.gov/legis/2009_10/senate/reapportionment.php  
20
 Virginia State Constitution, Art. VII Sec. 5  
“Generally, redistricting 
commissions and courts are not 
subject to same electoral and 
institutional constraints as state 
legislators. However, they do have 
a responsibility to be fair and 
impartial.” 
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In Arizona, the commission on appellate court appointments creates a pool of 25 nominees.  
The highest ranking officer of the house appoints one from the pool, then the minority 
leader of the house appoints one, then the highest ranking officer of the senate appoints 
one, then the minority leader of the senate appoints one. These four commissioners then 
appoint a fifth from the pool, not a member of any party already represented on the 
commission, as chair.   
In Arkansas, the redistricting commission consists of the governor, secretary of state, and 
the attorney general. The plan becomes official 30 days after it’s filed.21  In Missouri, there 
are two separate redistricting committees.  The Governor picks one person from two 
separate lists submitted by each political party to form the house committee.  The Governor 
also picks five people from two lists by both parties for form the senate committee. 
Commission members are forbidden to hold office four years after redistricting. 
In Ohio, the redistricting board consists of the governor, auditor, secretary of state, and two 
people selected by the legislative leaders of each major political party.22 In Washington, 
majority and minority leaders of the House and Senate each select one member to their 
redistricting commission. The four nominees then select a non-voting fifth member to chair 
the commission.  If the four appointed commissioners fail to select a fifth member by the 
January 1st, the state Supreme Court will select the fifth member. All commission members 
must not be public officials.23  
With the passage of Proposition 11 in 2008, control of California’s state redistricting process 
was moved from the state legislative authority and given to a 14-member commission.  If 
approved, districts will be required to have one member, have reasonably equal populations, 
be geographically contiguous and be numbered consecutively from north to south. The 
geographic integrity of any city, country, city and country, or region should be respected.24 
The commission then has eight and a half months to draw and approve the maps. Approval 
requires votes from nine of the 14 commissioners: three Democrats, three Republicans and 
three affiliated with other parties or registered as decline-to-state voters. 
Finally, in Pennsylvania, majority and minority leaders of the legislative houses each select 
one member to their redistricting commission. These four members then must select a fifth 
to chair the commission. If they fail to do so within 45 days, a majority of the state Supreme 
Court will select the fifth member. As with most states, the chair of the redistricting 
commission cannot be a public official.25   
 
 
                                                     
21
 Arkansas State Constitution Art. 8 Sec. 1 
22
 Ohio State Constitution Sec. 1 Art. XI 
23
 Washington State Constitution Art. II Sec. 43 
24
 League of Women Voters California. Redistricting and Proposition 11 Analysis. 
http://ca.lwv.org/lwvc/edfund/elections/2008nov/pc/prop11.html 
25
Pennsylvania State Constitution Art. II Sec. 17 
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3.3 Iowa: a Unique Case 
Iowa conducts a redistricting process unlike any other state.  Nonpartisan Legislative 
Services Bureau (NLSB) staff develops maps for the Iowa House, Senate, and U.S. House 
districts and is not allowed to use party registration data or consider the homes of 
incumbents when redrawing district boundaries.  The centerpiece of the redistricting 
provisions are the redistricting principles which specifically forbid the use of political 
affiliation, previous election results, the addresses of incumbents, or any demographic 
information other than population.  The redistricting plans must be drawn based on the 
following four criteria (in descending order of importance):  
 Population equality 
 Contiguity 
 Unity of counties and cities 
 Compactness 
The NLSB is required to submit up to three plans for final vote in each legislative chamber. 
Both chambers must decide upon one final plan.  If the legislature does not approve the first 
three plans devised by the bureau, it must itself approve a plan by September 1st, or the state 
Supreme Court will take responsibility for the state districts. The Governor has final veto 
power over the approved plan.26  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
26
 The Center for Voting and Democracy, Public Interest Guide to Redistricting: Iowa’s Redistricting 
Information. http://archive.fairvote.org/redistricting/reports/remanual/ia.htm  
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4.0 Objective Criteria 
 
If political leaders want to conduct a redistricting process that is both transparent and 
accountable, objective criteria must be developed. Using a “best practices” approach from a 
survey of redistricting practices across the nation, we have developed four criteria that any 
prospective redistricting map can be created and evaluated. Taken together, these criteria 
would better guarantee fair, intuitive, and practical district maps. 
4.1 Communities of Interest 
In other words, do citizens vote with their natural neighbors?  Some reform advocates 
explain: “Counties, municipalities, and other government boundaries give… a sense of place 
and shared interests.”27 With this concern, the redistricting official aims to split as few 
counties as possible, and divide cities into as few districts as possible. Careful attention will 
need to be made to ensure that no communities of interest are split into two separate 
districts.    
Objective Measures:  
 How many counties are divided by district lines?  
 How many cities are divided by district lines? 
 How many districts are used to divide the home counties of major cities? 
4.2 Representational Fairness 
In other words, are demographic and party groups given a fair allotment? No party or 
ethnic interest should be given more or less “likely-to-win” districts than their numbers 
would allot. “The counterbalance for competitiveness is assuring that a final redistricting 
plan does not unfairly bias one party over another.”28 
Objective Measures:  
 Ethnic and racial minorities should be allotted the proportion of majority-minority 
districts that matches their demographic representation in the state as closely as 
possible.29 
 Effort should be made to use the most up-to-date U.S. Census Bureau data.  
 
                                                     
27
 Ohio Secretary of State Press Release, June 18, 2009: Ohio Redistricting Competition, 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/redistricting.aspx.  
28
 Ohio Secretary of State Press Release, June 18, 2009: Ohio Redistricting Competition,    
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/redistricting.aspx.  
29
 King, Gary, John Bruce, and Andrew Gelman. "Racial Fairness in Legislative Redistricting." In Classifying by       
Race, edited by Paul E. Peterson. Princeton University Press, 1996. 
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4.3 Compactness 
In other words, do the districts appear fair? The classic abuse of redistricting is the 
gerrymandered district: strangely-shaped, often thin, and lacking intuitive unity. Sometimes 
referred to as the “look” or “shape” of a district, compactness assures that bizarrely-shaped 
legislative districts are minimized. To this end, redistricting maps should seek to maximize 
the visibly condensed geography of districts drawn. Also, constituents should be able to 
clearly look at a map and understand which Congressional district they are located within.30 
Compact districts are easier for the voter to understand, and intuitively enhance the public 
credibility of the redistricting plan. Of course, maps with more compact districts are 
preferable to maps with fewer. 
 
Objective Measures:  
 The straight line test: would a straight line drawn between the two farthest points of 
a district cross outside of the district?  
 To compare the compactness of alternative plans: how many districts in each plan fail 
to pass the straight line test? 
4.4 Legality 
In other words, does the map fulfill relevant legal requirements?  The political ideals of 
the American electorate have been institutionalized through legislation governing voting 
rights and redistricting.31 Furthermore, a redistricting plan is worthless if it is not upheld in 
federal and state courts. Every proposed map should be in full compliance with known, 
relevant legal standards of review, whether federal law, state law or judicial precedent.32 
Objective Measures:  
 For each relevant legal requirement, the redistricting map is given a score of 1 
(satisfactory) or 0 (unsatisfactory). A perfect score for every district is required. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
30
 Ohio Secretary of State Press Release, June 18, 2009: Ohio Redistricting Competition,    
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/redistricting.aspx. 
31
 Texas Legislative Council. State and Federal Law Governing Redistricting in Texas, Chapter 2. 
http://www.tlc.state.tx.us/pubspol/redlaw01/redlaw01.pdf. 
32
 Ohio Secretary of State Press Release, June 18, 2009: Ohio Redistricting Competition,    
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/redistricting.aspx. 
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5.0 Redistricting Map Alternatives 
 
There may be no one perfect way to create a redistricting map; it can be difficult to balance 
conflicting ideals. In creating a final Congressional map, Capstone team members did not 
want to be influenced by previously authorized Congressional district maps. Due to Texas’ 
disconcerting past with regard to redistricting, our team sought to ensure that our proposed 
redistricting map would be considered legal by U.S. Department of Justice officials.  
We analyzed the demographic data and found that ideally, there would be 4 majority-black 
districts, 1 majority-Asian district, 14 majority-Hispanic districts, and 17 majority-white 
districts. Because the populations are spread out, this would be impossible to accomplish. 
We initially drew districts based on compactness and communities of interest. When the 
map was complete, we discovered we were able to create two majority-black districts while 
adhering to compactness and existing boundaries. However, the vast majority of districts 
would have a white majority. An Asian-majority district also could not be created. We 
developed three options that illustrate maps resulting from different weighted criteria. In 
drawing final redistricting maps, we used the web-based Redistricting 2.0 program 
developed by software engineer Dave Bradlee. This software was chosen for its intuitive 
design and capability to produce high resolution redistricting maps.33    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
33
 Bradlee, Dave. Redistricting 2.0 Software, http://www.gardow.com/davebradlee/default.html 
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5.1 Congressional Redistricting Map Alternative #1 
Congressional Redistricting Map One represents the initial map with a focus on 
compactness and communities of interest. We did not alter any districts to try to better 
match demographics. Twenty-four majority-white districts include the following districts: 
1,2,3,5,6,7,9,10,11,12,13, 14,15,16,18,19,20,21,22,25,26,27,28, and 30. The 10 majority-Hispanic 
districts include 4, 17, 24, 29,31,32,33,34,35,36. Finally, the two districts that have a population 
greater than 50% are district 8 and district 23. See Figure 5.1a-d below for more information. 
 
 
Fig 5.1a—Congressional District 1: Statewide Map 
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Fig 5.1b—Congressional District Map 1: DFW Area 
 
 
Fig 5.1c—Congressional District Map 1: Houston Area 
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Fig 5.1d—Congressional District Map 1: Austin/San Antonio Area 
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5.2 Congressional Redistricting Map Alternative #2 
Congressional Redistricting Map Two represents the initial map with a focus on 
compactness and communities of interest with alterations to consider representational 
fairness. We did not break compactness and existing boundaries to create a third black 
district. While still adhering to compactness and communities of interest, we were able to 
make alterations to improve Hispanic representation. The 20 majority-white districts 
include the following districts: 1,2,5,6,7,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,19,20,21,26,27,28,30. The 14 
majority-Hispanic districts include these districts: 3,4,17,18,22,24,25,29,31,32,33,34,35,36. 
Finally, the two districts that have a black population greater than 50% are 8 and 23. See 
Figure 5.2a-d below for detailed description for each map below.   
 
Fig 5.2a—Congressional District 2: Statewide Map 
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Fig 5.2b—Congressional District Map 2: DFW Area 
 
Fig 5.2c—Congressional District Map 2: Houston Area 
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Fig 5.2d—Congressional District Map 2: Austin/San Antonio Area 
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5.3 Congressional Redistricting Map Alternative #3 
Congressional Redistricting Map Three places priority on representational fairness. 
While our Capstone team was unable to create four majority-black districts, we were able to 
create a third majority-black district (District 27). We then developed the remainder of the 
map based on the district and added Hispanic representation. The 19 majority-white 
districts include: 1,2,5,6,7,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,19,20,21,26,28 and 30. There are 14 majority-
Hispanic districts. These include the following districts: 3,4,17,18,22,24,25,29,31,32,33,34,35 
and 36. Finally, there are 3 majority-black districts: 8, 23 and 27. See Fig. 5.3a-d below for 
more information.    
 
 
 
Fig 5.3a—Congressional District Map 3: Statewide Map 
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Fig 5.3b—Congressional District Map 3: DFW Area 
 
 
Fig 5.3c—Congressional District Map 3: Houston Area 
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Fig 5.3d—Congressional District Map 3: Austin/San Antonio Area 
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6.1a Map #3 Congressional Districts 
White Black Hispanic
Figure 6.1 The top demonstrates the number of 
Congressional Districts. Notice that it matches 
closely with the demographic make-up of Texas.   
6.0 Map #3: Benefits & Limitations 
6.1 Why Congressional Map #3 
Texas’s legal history took priority 
when selecting the best alternative map. 
Any Congressional map that did not 
contain strict representational fairness 
would be rejected by federal election 
officials. Since the 2000 Texas 
Congressional District map contained 
three majority-black districts, our 
Capstone team did not believe a map that 
contained fewer than three majority-black 
districts would be approved by federal and 
state courts.  For this reason, we believe 
Congressional Plan #3 to be the best map. 
No district has a variation of more than 
1,000 people, with a standard deviation of 
537. 
 
Among the 14 Hispanic districts, the 
average Hispanic population was 390,626, 
or 55% of the population as a whole. 
Among the 19 majority-white districts, the 
average white population was 410, 820, 
representing an average of 59% of total 
district population.  Finally, among the 
three majority-black districts in CD Map 
#3, there was an average of 374,991 black 
residents, representing an average of 52% 
of district population.  
 
It should be noted that because of the 
size and make-up of current voting 
districts, it was impossible to create a 
representative map with 36 districts with 
exactly 698,488 individuals. While the 
map does break communities of interest 
and at least one district (CD 27) has an 
unusual appearance, these changes were 
necessary to ensure representation and 
legality.  
54% 
12% 
34% 
6.1b Texas Demographic Make-up, 2010 
White Black Hispanic
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6.2 Congressional Map #3 Benefits 
There are several benefits that could result from this objective redistricting analysis. 
Criteria selected for this analysis were obtained from several non-partisan and bi-partisan 
research institutions seeking to encourage and promote greater representativeness within 
state government.  Credible criteria recommendations were obtained from: The National 
Conference on State Legislatures (NCSL), the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the 
CATO and Urban Institutes.  Texas redistricting plans in the past have been criticized for 
appearing “gerrymandered,” or jagged and confusing for people to understand clearly.  By 
creating districts with greater district compactness, the Texas voting public will understand 
more clearly which district they are located within.   
 
This proposed redistricting plan should also encourage greater public participation 
because the public will see that districts were drawn in a fair, objective manner.   
Redistricting plans have also been criticized for not encouraging greater minority 
participation within state government. By adhering to representational fairness criteria, 
ethnic and racial minorities will be allotted the proportion of majority-minority districts that 
matches their demographic representation in the state as closely as possible, as indicated in 
U.S. Census data. 
6.3 Congressional Map #3 Limitations 
With any proposed redistricting map, there are limitations associated with the criteria 
selected for this analysis.  For example, determining “Communities of Interest” will be next 
to impossible to guarantee that it is done in an objective way.  Researchers for this analysis 
will have to rely on Census data and knowledge of Texas to formulate such a map. We are 
also aware that our proposed map could be seen as “unfairly” benefitting minority groups. 
Third, we recognize that it is difficult to perform an “objective” analysis on an inherently 
political topic; claims of “objectivity” are hard to make, especially on the subject of 
redistricting.  Finally, we recognize that there will be several instances where our 
“communities of interest” and “district compactness” criteria will be contradictory.  To 
include communities of interest, we may have to sacrifice district compactness. This will 
result in many cases were we must rely on our own “expert” judgment, resulting in inherent 
bias in the redistricting plan.   
Finally, given time constraints to this analysis, we were unable to incorporate precinct 
voting history into our analysis.  However, it is not likely that this will greatly impact the 
objectivity of our final redistricting plan.  Ideally, the Republican and Democratic parties 
should receive the proportion of voting districts that matches their demographic 
representation as closely as possible, as indicated in previous elections. However, our time 
and software limitations kept us from extending our analysis to previous election data 
broken down by district. Future redistricting analysis work should address this deficiency.  
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Fig 7.1  This map demonstrates the additions and 
losses of Congressional districts by each state in 
2010 due to population changes. (SOURCE: 
www.catchthedogs.com) 
7.0 Conclusion 
 
Redistricting is a complicated and crucial political process, required by demographic 
changes and subject to many laws and sociopolitical interests. Drawing the lines that 
determine where citizens get to vote is a high and mighty responsibility. Unfortunately, the 
politicians in charge often use that high and mighty power for their own ends.  
Because of the inherent complexity and political impact of redistricting, the history of 
redistricting in America has been fraught with conflict, controversy, and confusion. Texas 
has a particularly sensitive history with regard to redistricting.  In 2003, after Republicans 
had won control of the Legislature for the first time in more than 130 years, the state 
legislature passed a controversial new Congressional map. In response, all 52 Democratic 
legislators fled the state in order to prevent a quorum and stalled the legislative process for 
weeks.34  Despite nationwide demands by public interest groups for Texas to reconsider how 
district maps are drawn and approved, a federal court ruled that the final Texas 
Congressional map “was not substantially unfair and did not violate the one-person, one-
vote principle of the Voting Rights Act.”35 While the redistricting process for the 82nd 
Legislative Session is likely to be considerably more civil than in 2003, it is inevitable that 
politics will continue to play a significant role in how district lines are drawn. During the 
2011 redistricting cycle, with Texas Republicans holding a majority in the Senate and a super-
majority in the House, it is likely that redistricting will again be a wholly political endeavor. 
 
Over the next 20 years, the 
population of the United States 
will undergo significant 
demographic changes. Texas in 
particular will be changing 
rapidly.  A majority of the 
state’s population will be 
Hispanic by the end of the 
decade, and it is inevitable that 
more diverse interest groups 
that reflect this changing 
population will want greater 
participation in the lawmaking 
process. Declines in population in 
western portions of the state and 
the rapid increase within the state’s 
urban eastern counties will likely 
result in the need for legislation 
                                                     
34
 AP, Trial Begins in Texas Redistricting Case, Associated Press, Dec. 12, 2003. http://articles.boston.com/2003-
12-12/news/29195720_1_gop-map-texas-republicans-republican-drawn  
35
 League of Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 2006. 462 U.S. 725 
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targeted toward tackling issued such as transportation, affordable housing, and urban 
education. Overall, Texas’ growing population will mean that Texas will gain increased 
representation in Congress. In 2010, for example, Texas gained four new Congressional seats. 
Therefore, it is critical that districts be drawn to ensure accurate representation in both 
Congress and in the State Legislature, given the state’s burgeoning population increase.  
 
By ensuring that districts are drawn based on these four objective criteria discussed above, 
state lawmakers, the public, and federal election officials will have greater confidence that 
every effort has been made to include all interests in the lawmaking process. Texas is poised 
to grow significantly both economically and culturally.  Ensuring that all voices are heard 
will help to sustain a healthy future for many years to come. 
Redistricting has long been haunted by bitter partisan strife. Whether through an 
independent, nonpartisan commission, or the adoption of objective criteria in the legislative 
process, it is time for reform.  
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